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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS P. SPRUNT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE WEST-
ERN RAILROAD CO~IPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
Comes now the plaintiff in the above-entitled cause 
and respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for 
rehearing in this cause for the following reasons and 
upon the following grounds: 
I. 
The Court erred in holding that the facts as found 
by it did not constitute the defense of assumption of 
risk as a matter of law. 
II. 
The Court erred in holding that the evidence found 
by the Court did present a jury question on the problmu 
of contributory negligence. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITIO~ 
FOR REHEARING 
The problem herein presented is a simple problem 
in point of fact. As the Court has already indicated, 
it may be posed as follows : 
"M:ay the identical facts which fonnerlY con-
stituted the defense in law of assumption ~f risk 
be used in lieu of such defense as a basis for a 
partial defense of contributory negligence?" 
This problem in times past and prior to the 1939 
amendment, 45 U.S.C.A., Sec. 54, \vas in fact a very im-
portant one. The Court found it easy to define aca-
demically what constituted contributory negligence and 
what constituted assumption of risk. The problem arose 
when these academic principles were applied to a specific 
set of facts. The Court in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line 
Railroad Co., 318 U. S. 54, 87 L. Ed. 610, found that 
the Federal Code Annotated and the United States 
Code Annotated devoted over thiry (30) pages, each in 
fine print, merely to the citation and a brief sununary of 
the reported decision on this proble1n and that in ad-
dition that the number of unreported and settled cases 
in which the defense was involved ran into the thousands. 
The Court further found that the difficulty actually 
was that of disinguishing between contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk. The Court stated after 
reviewing these facts : 
"In the disposition of ca8e~, the question of 
plaintiff's assumption of ri~k ha~ frequently been 
treated si1nply as another way of appraising de-
fendant's 1wgl igt'lH'l' as was done by the Court 
2 
"-, \ '. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in the instant case. The purpose of the 1939 
mnendment was to eliminate this confusion to 
si1nply the administration of the act by complete 
elimination of the defense of assumption of risk 
in all its phases." 
Immediately after the passing of the Act, the carrier 
shifted to a new approach, namely, that of non-negli-
gence. The gist of this defense was that the railroad 
was not negligent-a type of "last clear chance" doctrine, 
if a man knowingly entered into property that he knew 
was defective. This defense was found to lack validity 
as was indicated by a number of decisions cited in 
plaintiff's main brief. 
Now, we see a new approach, nainely, that while 
the defense of non-negligence is no longer available and 
will not be considered as a defense because of the facts 
upon which non-negligence was predicated actually con-
stituted the defense of assumption of risk, that the facts 
which formerly constituted assumption of risk now con-
stitute contributory negligence. The question involved 
herein is whether or not such a contention and such a 
proposed defense is available to the carrier. 
It is submitted that if this be true then the Courts 
and the parties before the Courts are put back on the 
same old "1nerry-go-round" that the 1939 amendment 
attempted to prevent. Indeed, the injured worker is in 
worse shape because the doctrine of contributory negli-
gence is hereby expanded to include assumption of risk-
a defense that was theoretically outlawed. Its effective-
ness is vividly pointed out in the instant case when plain-
tiff's recovery was so viciously cut. We submit that in 
so holding that the Court ruled contrary to the de-
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cisions in the Federal Courts and that in so doing we 
respectfully submit the Court erred. 
In examining this problem, we must recognize that 
Federal law governs as did Judge Crockett in the case 
of Maxfield v. D. & R. G., Utah, decided October 23, 1958, 
330 P. 2d 1018, when he stated at page 1019: 
"However, the instant case is not eontrolled 
by those decisions, nor does the instant ca~e ::ffect 
the law of our state. It was brought under the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 e.S.C.A., 
51 et seq., and federal law is applicable, as recog-
nized in Kirchgestner v. Denver R.G.\V.R. Co." 
For convenience, our views will be presented under 
the two points of argument heretofore stated. 
ARGU1IENT 
I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDIXG THAT THE 
EVIDENCE. FOUND BY IT DID NOT COXSTITUTE 
THE DEFENSE OF ASSUJ\IPTIOX OF RISK: AS A 
1IATTER OF LA \Y. 
The case of Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Dine Railroad 
Company, 87 L. Ed. 610, 318 C'. 8. 34, is, of course, the 
leading decision on this particular problen1. In Yiew 
of the fact that it was fully discussed in the petitioner's 
original brief, there is no partieular point in rehashing 
it. However, it is believed that there are two Pxcerpts 
that are of vital i1nportanee in this matter. 
In Jus tire Black's principal decision, he says: 
" ~ * \Yt> hold that t>Yery vestige of the 
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doctrine of a8stunption of risk was obliterated 
from the law by the 1939 amendment, and that 
Congress, by abolishing the defense of assumption 
of risk in that statute did not mean to leave open 
the identical defense for the master by changing 
its name to "non-negligence.' As this Court said 
in facing the hazy 1nargin between negligence and 
assumption of risk as involved in the Safety 
Appliance Act of (:March 2,) 1893, 45 USCA § l, 
"Unless great care be taken, the servant's rights 
will be sacrificed by simply charging him with 
assumption of risk under another name;" and 
no such result can be permitted here." 
It will be noted that the language specifically faces 
the problem of the "hazy margin between negligence and 
assumption of risk," and cites the former case of 
Schlmemmer v. Buffalo R & T Railroad Co., 205 U. S. 
1, 51 L. Ed. 681, with approval. 
The concurring opinion of :Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
therefore, is of great interest because he concurred in 
the decision of Justice Black and amplified that par-
ticular state1nent when he wrote: 
"But an e1nployee cannot be charged with 
contributory negligence simply because he as-
sumes the risk." 
In the facts at issue here, the Supre1ne Court has 
found that the plaintiff was injured when in attempting 
to board one of the moving cars in his customary manner 
he got a hold with his left hand but missed with his 
right because he had stepped into a hole, slipped, caus-
ing him to lose his balance and fall. The Court further 
found that the plaintiff had known that the terrain 
adjacent to the track was rough and pit marked with 
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holes but that the hole wa~ obscured on the day in 
question by snow. 
The Court did not find but it is implicit in the facts 
that the plaintiff did not know of the existence or the 
presence of the hole in which he slipped until after he 
fell because he could not see it by virtue of the snow. 
Consequently, the fact of knowledge on the part of the 
plaintiff is not pre~ent in this case. The only question, 
therefore, is the question as to whether constructive 
knowledge of the existence of this exact hole was pro-
vided for him by virtue of his six Inonths knowledge 
previously that the terrain was rough and pit 1narked 
with holes. 
The Federal Courts and decisions on this problem 
have long recognized that there is a distinction between 
the defense of assumption of risk and of contributory 
negligence. See Knowles v. Southern Railu·ay, Virginia, 
12 S. E. 2d 821, McClain v. Charleston & lr. C. Railway 
Co., South Carolina, ..J. S. E. 2d 280. 
The case of Thomas v. [Tniun Railzcay Company, 
6th Circuit, 216 F. 2d 18, has by all odds the closest 
facts to the case at bar. In that case, the plaintiff sus-
tained injuries while carrying out his duties as an em-
ployee of the railroad. \Yhile walking along the concrete 
floor of the roundhouse, he slipped and fell because his 
foot caine in contact with pin grea~e that had been left 
on the concrete through the negligence of the railroad. 
There can be no question a~ to what the l'ourt found 
as a fact, that the plaintiff knew or should haYe known 
of thP Pxi::-;tenee of the grease on the floor; that such 
nPgled on tlw part of thP railroad wa~ well known to 
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the plaintiff and others. The 'rrial Court found for the 
defendant and the plaintiff appealed. It would seein, 
therefore, that when the Court reversed the District 
Court and sent the case back for new trial that if these 
facts were susceptible of the proof of negligence, the 
Court would have said so. On the rationale of the 
decision in the instant case and paraphrasing the lang-
uage of Justice vVade in the instant decision, the Court 
could very well have said that: 
"It would appear not to be unreasonable 
to conclude that a reasonably prudent person 
with knowledge of the fact that grease was on 
the floor would take precautions to ascertain 
whether he ·was standing in or near sufficiently 
firm ground to avoid falling." 
It will be observed, ho\vever, that nowhere does the 
Court make such a stateinent and, yet, in view of the 
fact that this case would have to be retried, it would 
appear self-evident that if this were in fact negligence 
the Court should and would have so advised and guided 
the Trial Court in its future conduct. 
The specific problem of contributory negligence was 
raised in Johnson 1:. Erie Railroad ComJWIJ:IJ, New York, 
1st Circuit, 236 F. 2d 352. The plaintiff was injured 
while working in a rail wa~· mail <'ar between two other 
cars standing on a spur trac·k. 'l1he impact cam:~ed hy 
the engine coupling onto the can.; without warning caused 
plaintiff to lose his balance and fall. The Court specifi-
cally instructed upon contributory negligence and in 
that regard raised the question as to what, if anything, 
he did contribute to his injury. Part of the difficulty 
in this ca:->e was attributed to the fact that he had had 
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a previous injury and he knew that any knock or jar 
would aggravate his condition. However, the Court 
of Appeals held that the effect of its posing of the 
question of contributory negligence forced the jury to 
consider assumption of risk and in so doing a new trial 
was required. 
The only case that would appear to give the defend-
ant any comfort is that of Murray v. New York, Ne~ 
Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, 2d Circuit, 255 
F. 2d 42. In that case, the Court discusses the difference 
between assumption of risk and contributory negligence 
and concluded that in the particular case involved, con-
tributory negligence lay. However, an examination of 
the decision indicates that the basis for the opinion 
that contributory negligence lay, arose from the fact that 
the plaintiff was accused of a violation of a company 
rule. 
Violation of a rule is a fact that has always been 
outside the doctrine of assumption of risk. See Owens 
v. U. P., Washington, 63 Supreme Court 1271, 319 U. S. 
715, 87 L. Ed. 1683. Again, the violation of a rule does 
not constitute assun1ption of risk but is at most con-
tributory negligence leading to division of damages. 
Cross v. Spokane and P & S Railway Co., 291 P. 336, 
157 Waslzingtuu 428. Certiorari denied, 51 Supreme 
Court 345, 283 U. S. 821, 73 L. Ed. 1436. 
It will be seen that the :Murray case had in addition 
to the facts that established assun1ption of risk an addi-
tional fact that had never been classified as at'suinption 
of risk but on the contrary had always been classified 
as nPgligenre or contributory negligence. \Vhere, it 
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might be asked, is the additional fact that takes the 
case at bar out of assumption of risk and into the realm 
of contributory negligence'? 
It is believed that the Suprmue Court of the United 
States has already answered this question. In Pryor 
1.:. Al ega lV illiam..,, 1920, 65 L. Ed. 120, the Court had 
before it an action under the F. E. L. A. where negligence 
\\·a~ charged against the defendant as receiver of the 
Wabash Railroad C01upany. The plaintiff was engaged 
in tearing down a bridge. rrhere was a defect in the 
claw bar which he was directed to use and said defect 
caused the bar to slip. He lost his balance and fell to 
the ground some twelve ( 12) feet below. The Trial 
Court found that the defect in the claw bar was so 
obvious that the rnost cursory and superficial inspect-
ion would have disclosed it to the plaintiff. The defend-
ant charged assumption of risk and contributory negli-
gence. A jury verdict was entered in favor of the 
plaintiff for $5,000.00; however, the 'l_lrial Court re-
versed the judgment and denied a :Motion for Rehearing. 
The Supreme Court of 1\Iissouri, on appeal, held that 
the facts involved did not constitute assumption of 
risk but did, if anything, amount to contributory negli-
gence and that sueh negligence under the 11-,ederal 
statutes worked a reduction in damages and not a defeat 
of the action. 'rhe Supreme Court of the United States 
reversed, finding that the facts constituted assumption 
of risk and not contributory negligence. 
The effect of this decision is that when an employe(' 
is injured hy reason of defects in a claw har which he 
is using and which an ordinary prudent eu1ployee would 
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not have used because of those defects that the em-
ployee is guilty of assumption of risk as a 1natter of 
law and not of contributory negligence. 
If it is assumption of risk and not contributory 
negligence for a person to use a defective bar where 
the defects were so obvious that a cursory examination 
would have indicated them, can it be otherwise here for 
a man to fail to observe a defect in the ground covered by 
snow which would have been found according to the 
Supreme Court decision in the event he had made the 
examination as an ordinary prudent person would have 
made. However, if there is any last lingering doubt as 
to whether this constitutes assumption of risk, it is 
believed that they are dispelled by two cases. One from 
the Supreme Court of Minnesota, Jacobson v. Chicago & 
Northwestern Railroad, 22 N. W. 2d 455, where the Court 
held at page 459 : 
"In detern1ining whether plaintiff was guilty 
of contributory negligence and whether, as de-
fendant claims, his contributory n~gligence was 
the sole proximate cause of the accident, it is 
our plain duty to lay out of 1nind any question 
of whether he was guilty of assun1ption of risk, 
because that defense was entirely obliterated by 
the 1939 mnendment of the act. Crawford v. D. 
M. & I. R. Ry. Co., 220 ~linn. 225, 19 N. \Y. 2d 384. 
The defense of assun1ption of risk is not to be 
let in under the label of contributory negligence. 
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U. S. 
54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 87 L. Ed. 610, 143 A.L.R. 967, 
supra. See, :Maloney v. Cunard Stemnship Co., 
Ltd., 217 N. Y. 278, 111 N. E. 835." 
Finally, in the case of Southcr11 Pacific Com,pany r. 
10 
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Allen, Texas, 106 S. W. 2d 441, the Court had before it 
the identical argument to that at bar, namely, that the 
facts which constituted assumption of risk may also 
constitute contributory negligence and even though the 
one is barred the other may be presented to the jury 
notwithstanding that both the instructions of assumpt-
ion or risk and contributory negligence are based on the 
identical facts. The Court disposed of this matter at 
page 446 as follows : 
"If, in cases where the same facts which 
would make out the defense of assu1ned risk 
(were such defense not abolished) would also 
constitute the defense of contributory negligence, 
the latter defense should be allowed to prevail, 
the humane and beneficient purpose of Congress 
would in a large number of cases be rendered 
abortive. Therefore, as a statute should be so 
construed as to accmnplish its evident intention 
and purpose, we are of the opinion that the act, 
in abolishing the defense of assumed risk, did 
away with any other defense, though of a differ-
ent name, which would be constituted by identi-
cally the smne facts which go to establish that of 
assumed risk." 
No case was cited hy the Court in support of its 
position that the two different defenses may arise and 
be predicated upon the identical statement of fact. The 
defendant did in its brief, as page 20, cite the case of 
L & l\[ Railroad Con1pany v. l\lorrill, Alabama, 99 S. 
297, in support of this position. However, an examin-
ation of the case clearl~' indicates that the case does not 
support the position assigned it by the defendant. In 
that case the Court said that if it found one set of facts 
that the jury would be warranted in finding assumption 
11 
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of risk, that, if on the other hand, they found a second 
set of facts that it would be justified at finding contri-
butory negligence. Now here did the Supreme Court 
of Alabama say that the jury would be warranted in 
finding both from the identical statement of facts. 
ARGUMENT 
II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
EVIDENCE FOUND BY THE COURT DID PRE-
SENT A JURY QUE:STION ON THAT PROBLE~I 
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
The plaintiff was on these unfit and dangerous 
premises because he was required to do so by reason 
of his employment. He did not have a choice in selection 
and while he went voluntarily, it must be recognized 
that he went voluntarily because he desired to continue 
his employment. 
The mere fact that a servant is aware that he is 
exposing himself to danger does not make his guilty 
of contributory negligence. Toone l'. J. 0. O'K eill Con-
struction Company, Utah, 121 P. 10; "A'eit.zke v. Kraft-
Phenix Dairies, Inc., 214 lVisconsin 4-!1, 253 N. TV. 579; 
Kaumans r. lVhite Star Gas & Oil Company, 63 P. 'Jd 
231; Schirra l.'. D. L. & Tr. Ry. Co., 103 Fed. Supp. 812. 
Plaintiff desires to eite but one case in support of 
its position to the effect that the facts herein do not 
constitute contributory negligence of any kind on the 
12 
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part of the plaintiff. That case is the case of Schrader 
v. Kriesel, Jiinn., 1950, 45 N. W. 2d 395. This appeal 
arose out of a tort action wherein the plaintiffs, husband 
and wife, were suing the defendant, a used car dealer, 
for injury sustained by the wife while walking upon the 
premises of the defendant. The plaintiff wife had been 
on the premises of the defendant before. She had ob-
served the surface of the lot previous to the date of 
injury and knew in advance that the surface was rough 
although she did not see the rut which caused the fall 
on the day in question because the ruts were covered with 
snow. She further stated that on her previous visits she 
had made similar observations although upon her pre-
vious visits conditions were not as bad as they were on 
the night of the accident. Only one of the three questions 
raised on appeal is relevant to this problem, and that 
question was : 
"Was the plaintiff contributorily negligent?" 
The Suprerne Court held that it was a jury question 
but that the jury question was whether or not the 
plaintiff had assurned the risk of injury upon entering 
the property of the used car dealer and not whether she 
was guilty of contributory negligence or not. 
It is difficult to see how a case could be rnuch 
closer on the facts than the instant case with the 
Schrader case. In both cases, the party knew or had 
reason to know or believe that the surface was rough. 
In both cases, the ground was covered with ~now so that 
the ruts, holes or unevenness was obscured from their 
13 
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v1ew. In the one case, it is held to be assumption of 
risk and not contributory negligence. It is subn1itted 
that there is no factual or legal basis for the predication 
of the conclusion that a negligence question arose in 
this case to be submitted to the jury, and, we respectfully 
suggest that the Court erred in so holding. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. C. PATTERSON, 
Attorney for Plaintiff. 
14 
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